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Abstract
Massive amounts of fake news and conspiratorial content have spread
over social media before and after the 2016 US Presidential Elections de-
spite intense fact-checking efforts. How do the spread of misinformation
and fact-checking compete? What are the structural and dynamic charac-
teristics of the core of the misinformation diffusion network, and who are
its main purveyors? How to reduce the overall amount of misinformation?
To explore these questions we built Hoaxy, an open platform that enables
large-scale, systematic studies of how misinformation and fact-checking
spread and compete on Twitter. Hoaxy filters public tweets that include
links to unverified claims or fact-checking articles. We perform k-core
decomposition on a diffusion network obtained from two million retweets
produced by several hundred thousand accounts over the six months be-
fore the election. As we move from the periphery to the core of the net-
work, fact-checking nearly disappears, while social bots proliferate. The
number of users in the main core reaches equilibrium around the time of
the election, with limited churn and increasingly dense connections. We
conclude by quantifying how effectively the network can be disrupted by
penalizing the most central nodes. These findings provide a first look at
the anatomy of a massive online misinformation diffusion network.
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1 Introduction
The viral spread of online misinformation is emerging as a major threat to
the free exchange of opinions, and consequently to democracy. Recent Pew
Research Center surveys found that 63% of Americans do not trust the news
coming from social media, even though an increasing majority of respondents
uses social media to get the news on a regular basis (67% in 2017, up from 62%
in 2016). Even more disturbing, 64% of Americans say that fake news have left
them with a great deal of confusion about current events, and 23% also admit to
passing on fake news stories to their social media contacts, either intentionally
or unintentionally [1–3].
Misinformation is an instance of the broader issue of abuse of social media
platforms, which has received a lot of attention in the recent literature [4–15].
The traditional method to cope with misinformation is to fact-check claims.
Even though some are pessimistic about the effectiveness of fact-checking, the
evidence is still conflicting on the issue [16, 17]. In experimental settings, per-
ceived social presence reduces the propensity to fact-check [18]. An open ques-
tion is whether this finding translates to the online setting, which would affect
the competition between low-and high-quality information. This question is
especially pressing. Even though algorithmic recommendation may promote
quality under certain conditions [19], models and empirical data show that low-
quality information may be as likely to go viral as high-quality information in
online social networks [15,20].
Technology platforms, journalists, fact checkers, and policymakers are de-
bating how to combat the threat of misinformation [21]. A number of systems,
tools, and datasets have been proposed to support research efforts about misin-
formation. Mitra and Gilbert, for example, proposed CREDBANK, a dataset
of tweets with associated credibility annotations [22]. Hassan et al. [23] built a
corpus of political statements worthy of fact-checking using a machine learning
approach. Some systems let users visualize the spread of rumors online. The
most notable are TwitterTrails [24] and RumorLens [25]. These systems, how-
ever, lack monitoring capabilities. The Emergent site [26] detected unverified
claims on the Web, tracking whether they were subsequently verified, and how
much they were shared. The approach was based on manual curation, and thus
did not scale.
The development of effective countermeasures requires an accurate under-
standing of the problem, as well as an assessment of its magnitude [27, 28]. To
date, the debate on these issues has been informed by limited evidence. On-
line social network data provides a way to investigate how human behaviors,
and in particular patterns of social interaction, are influenced by newsworthy
events [29]. Studies of news consumption on Facebook reveal that users tend to
confine their attention on a limited set of pages [30,31]. Starbird demonstrates
how alternative news sites propagate and shape narratives around mass-shooting
events [32].
Articles in the press have been among the earliest reports to raise the issue of
fake news [33]. Many of these analyses, however, are hampered by the quality
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of available data — subjective, anecdotal, or narrow in scope. In compari-
son, the internal investigations conducted by the platforms themselves appear
to be based on comprehensive disaggregated datasets [34, 35], but lack trans-
parency, owing to the two-fold risk of jeopardizing the privacy of users and of
disclosing internal information that could be potentially exploited for malicious
purposes [36].
Motivated by these limitations, in previous work we presented a prototype
of Hoaxy, an open platform for the study of the diffusion of misinformation and
its competition with fact-checking [37]. Here we build upon this prior effort,
contributing to the debate on how to combat digital misinformation in two
ways:
• We describe the implementation and deployment of the Hoaxy system,
which was first introduced in a 2016 demo [37]. The system has been
collecting data on the spread of misinformation and fact checking from
the public Twitter stream since June of 2016. It is now publicly available
(hoaxy.iuni.iu.edu). Users can query the tool to search instances of
claims and relative fact checking about any topic and visualize how these
two types of content spread on Twitter.
• We leverage the data collected by Hoaxy to analyze the diffusion of claims
and fact-checks on Twitter in the run up to and wake of the 2016 US
Presidential Election. This analysis provides a first characterization of
the anatomy of a large-scale online misinformation diffusion network.
When studying misinformation, the first challenge is to assess the truth-
fulness of a claim. This presents several difficulties. The most important is
scalability: it is impossible to manually evaluate a very large number of claims,
even for professional fact-checking organizations with dedicated staff. Here we
mitigate these issues by relying on a list of sources compiled by trusted third-
party organizations. In the run-up to and wake of the 2016 US Presidential
Elections, several reputable media and fact checking organizations have com-
piled lists of popular sources that routinely publish unverified content such as
hoaxes, conspiracy theories, fabricated news, click bait, and biased, misleading
content. In the remainder of the paper we informally refer to this content as
“claims.” We manually assess that the great majority of the claims published by
these sources, considered here, contain some form of misinformation or cannot
be verified (see Methods).
Hoaxy retrieves the full and comprehensive set of tweets that share (i.e.,
include a link to) claims and fact-checks. These tweets are important because,
by tracking them, we can observe how a particular piece of content spreads over
the social network. It is important to note that Hoaxy collects 100% of these
tweets, not a sample. This lets us obtain, for any given piece of misinformation
in our corpus, the full picture of how it spreads and competes with subsequent
fact-checking, if any.
In this paper we address three research questions:
3
• RQ1: How do the spread of misinformation and fact-checking compete?
• RQ2: What are the structural and dynamic characteristics of the core of
the misinformation diffusion network, and who are its main purveyors?
• RQ3: How to reduce the overall amount of misinformation?
We pose our first question (RQ1) to investigate whether those who are re-
sponsible for spreading claims are also exposed to corrections of those claims.
Regretfully, only 5.8% of the tweets in our dataset share links to fact-checking
content — a 1:17 ratio with misinformation tweets. We analyze the diffusion
network in the run up to the election, and find a strong core-periphery structure.
Fact-checking almost disappears as we move closer to the inner core of the net-
work, but surprisingly we find that some fact-checking content is being shared
even inside the main core. Unfortunately, we discover that these instances are
not associated with interest in accurate information. Rather, links to Snopes or
Politifact are shared either to mock said publications, or to mislead other users
(e.g., by falsely claiming that the fact-checkers found a claim to be true). This
finding is consistent with surveys on the trust on fact-checking organizations,
which find strong polarization of opinions [38].
Our second question (RQ2) is about characterizing the core of the claim
diffusion network. We find the main core to grow in size initially and then
become stable in both size and membership, while its density continues to in-
crease. We analyze the accounts in the core of the network to identify those
users who play an important role in the diffusion of misinformation. The use
of Botometer, a state-of-the-art social bot detection tool [12], reveals a higher
presence of social bots in the main core. We also consider a host of centrality
measures (in-strength, out-strength, betweenness, and PageRank) to character-
ize and rank the accounts that belong in the main core. Each metric emphasizes
different subsets of core users, but interestingly the most central nodes according
to different metrics are found to be similar in their partisan slant.
Our last question (RQ3) addresses possible countermeasures. Specifically we
ask what actions platforms could take to reduce the overall exposure to misinfor-
mation. Platforms have already taken some steps this direction, by prioritizing
high-quality over low-quality content [35,39]. Here we take a further step in this
direction and investigate whether penalizing the main purveyors of misinforma-
tion, as identified by RQ2, yields an effective mitigation strategy. We find that
a simple greedy solution would reduce the overall amount of misinformation
significantly.
All the analyses presented in this paper can be replicated by collecting data
through the Hoaxy API [40] or downloading the network dataset at doi.org/
10.5281/zenodo.1154840.
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2 Methods and data
2.1 Network core analysis
The k-core of a graph is formally defined as the maximal subgraph with nodes of
at least degree k. In practice, k-core decomposition uses a recursive procedure,
given the k-core, for extracting the (k + 1)-core by recursively removing all
nodes with degree k. The nodes that have been removed constitute the k-
shell. The k-core decomposition is the sequence of k-cores of increasing values
of k. Finally, the non-empty graph with maximum value of k is called the
main core. Prior work has used k-core decomposition to probe the structure of
complex networks [41,42]. In the case of social networks, k-cores can be used to
identify influential users [43], and to characterize the efficiency of information
spreading [44].
2.2 Bot detection
Social bots play an important role in the spread of misinformation [15]. Re-
searchers have built supervised learning tools to detect such automated accounts
with high accuracy. We leverage such a tool, called Botometer [12], to evaluate
Twitter accounts.
Botometer performs classification over a large set of features that include
temporal, network, language, and sentiment signals. The classifier is trained in
supervised fashion from a set of labeled examples. The set includes examples
discovered with a honeypot and by human raters. Two classifiers are available, a
standard one, which includes English-based language features, and a ‘universal’
one, which does not include language features, and is thus applicable beyond
English-speaking contexts. We use the standard classifier through a public
API [45,46].
2.3 Claim verification
Our analysis considers content published by a set of websites flagged as sources of
misinformation by third-party journalistic and fact-checking organizations. We
merged several lists of ‘misinformation’ sources compiled by such organizations.
It should be noted that these lists were compiled independently of each other,
and as a result they have uneven coverage. However, there is some overlap
between them. The full list is available online [47].
The source-based approach relies on the assumption that most of the claims
published by our compilation of sources are some type of misinformation, as we
cannot fact-check each individual claim. To validate this assumption, we manu-
ally verified a random sample of 50 articles drawn from our corpus, considering
only those sources whose articles were tweeted at least once in the period of
interest. Each article was evaluated independently by two reviewers, with ties
broken by a third reviewer. We applied a broadly used rubric based on seven
types of misinformation: fabricated content, manipulated content, imposter con-
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Table 1
Misinformation 
or inconclusive
72.7%
Verified 
claims
27.3% Verified
claims
27.3%
Misinformation
or inconclusive
72.7%
 1
Fig 1. Verification based on a sample of 50 claims. We excluded six articles
with no factual claim. Articles that could not be verified are grouped with
misinformation.
tent, false context, misleading content, false connection, and satire [21]. We also
added claims that could not be verified (inconclusive). Satire was not excluded
because fake-news sites often label their content as satirical, and viral satire is
often mistaken for real news. Further details about the verification procedure
can be found in a technical report [15]. Fig. 1 shows that only a minority of
claims in the collection (27%) can be verified. The sampling method biases the
analysis toward more prolific sources, some of which simply copy and past large
numbers of articles from other sources. The fraction of verified claims is cut in
half when sampling claims by tweets, thus biasing the sample toward popular
rather than prolific sources [15].
We also tracked the websites of several independent fact-checking organiza-
tions: politifact.com, snopes.com, factcheck.org, badsatiretoday.com,
hoax-slayer.com, opensecrets.org, and truthorfiction.com. In April 2017
we added climatefeedback.org, which does not affect the present analysis.
2.4 Hoaxy system architecture
Fig. 2 shows the architecture of the Hoaxy system. The system is composed
of a back-end and a front-end. Next we describe some of the technical aspects
that went into the design and implementation of these components.
2.4.1 Back-end
The back-end provides data collection, processing, storage, and indexing capa-
bilities. We start from the list of sources discussed earlier. Data are collected
from two realms: social media (i.e., Twitter) and the news source sites in the
list. To collect data from Twitter, Hoaxy filters the real-time stream for tweets
matching our list of domain keywords [48]. Matches are performed server-side
against the complete text of the tweet. This means that for each delivered tweet
we further make sure that the match is actually a hyperlink. Tweets that simply
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Fig 2. Hoaxy system architecture.
mention our sources but do not link to them (e.g., “I read this on snopes.com!”)
are discarded.
All matching link URLs are then extracted from the tweet and fetched di-
rectly from the source. To get a complete snapshot of all content produced by
the sources, Hoaxy also regularly crawls their websites in a separate process.
We use a mix of RSS and direct crawling to do so. Regardless of the way it
is collected, from each fetched document Hoaxy extracts title, metadata, and
body information.
All collected data (tweets and fetched documents) are saved in a relational
database. Documents are further indexed using Lucene [49], to enable full-text
search from the front-end.
Content duplication and document text extraction are two critical aspects
of this data collection pipeline. Because we are crawling data from the Web,
we expect to observe several different variants of the same URLs. This is espe-
cially true for the resources obtained from the social media stream, for which
duplication may occur due to marketing campaign and other tracking param-
eters, shortening (e.g., bit.ly) and snapshotting (e.g., archive.is) services,
and domain aliasing (e.g., dcgazette.com and thedcgazette.com).
While acknowledging that principled solutions to deal with the problem of
Web content duplication have been around for decades [50], we found that a
set of few, simple heuristics gave satisfactory results. For example, we found
that focusing on the most common tracking parameters (i.e. UTM parameters)
we can canonicalize about 30% of all URLs. Similarly, by following all types
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of HTTP redirect responses, we resolve shortened URLs for about 45% of the
URLs extracted from tweets. Snapshotting and domain aliases account instead
for only a handful of duplicates, and we simply ignore them.
We also had the problem of extracting the actual text of the fetched doc-
uments. There is a lot of extraneous content in the body of documents due
to the presence of ads, comment threads, and personalization. All this ‘noise’
poses a problem for indexing the corpus efficiently. Algorithms for document
text extraction have been around for several years [51]. We tested several imple-
mentations and eventually settled for the one offered by a third-party API [52].
Having collected, processed, stored, and indexed all the data, the final com-
ponent of the back-end is the API, a small piece of middleware that enables
programmatic access to both the relational database and the full-text Lucene
index for the purposes of search and visualization.
2.4.2 Front-end
Hoaxy provides an intuitive Web interface to search and visualize the spread of
claims contained in our database of misinformation, and the competition with
subsequent fact-checking verifications (see Fig. 3). The user first specifies a
query (Fig. 3(a)). Users can choose to retrieve either the most relevant or the
most recent results. To do so, we first send the query to Lucene, which returns
a list of most relevant/recent claims and fact-checking articles. In practice, be-
cause there are many more claim articles than fact-checking ones, and claims
tend to outperform fact-checking in terms of popularity, we rank claims sepa-
rately from fact-checks, and then merge the top results from the two rankings
into a single list. Finally we re-rank the results based on the number of tweets
in the database.
After selecting the results that match their query (Fig. 3(b)), the user can
finally visualize the results. Hoaxy provides two types of visualization: a time-
line plot (not shown in the figure) that displays the growth in the number of
tweets for both claims and fact-checking, and an interactive visualization of the
diffusion network (Fig. 3(c)). In the network, nodes represent Twitter accounts
and edges connect any two users that exchanged information by retweet, reply,
mention, or quoted retweet. Edge directionality represents the flow of informa-
tion, e.g., from the retweeted to the retweeter account or from the mentioning
to the mentioned account.
2.4.3 Deployment
We started collecting data with Hoaxy from 76 sources — 69 of claims and 7 of
fact-checking — in June 2016. In December 2016, 50 more sources of claims were
added. The system has collected data continuously ever since. As of October
2017, Hoaxy has collected a total of 29,351,187 tweets — 27,648,423 with links
to claim sources and 1,705,576 with links to fact-checking sources. The total
number of documents collected so far is 653,911 — 628,350 by claim sources
and 25,561 by fact-checking ones.
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Fig 3. Screen shots from the user interface of Hoaxy: (a) the user enters a
query in the search engine interface; (b) from the list of results, the user
selects articles including claims (purple) and/or related fact-checking (orange)
to visualize (colors online); (c) a detail from the interactive network diffusion
visualization for the query “three million votes aliens.” Edge colors represent
the type of information exchanged. The network shown here displays strong
polarization between claims and fact-checking, which is typical.
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Fig 4. Usage of Hoaxy in terms of daily volume of queries since the launch of
the public Web tool in December 2016. The two most frequent search terms
are shown in correspondence to some of the main peaks of user activity.
The public Web interface of Hoaxy was launched on December 20, 2016.
Fig. 4 plots the daily query volume and some of the most popular topics queried
by users over the course of the first 6 months of operation. Unsurprisingly,
the term ‘Trump’ is among the most popular search terms, but we also see
substantial churn in user interest, with topics following closely the most popular
pieces of controversial information of the moment, e.g., ‘vaccines,’ ‘pizzagate,’
‘voter fraud’ and ‘Trump Russia.’
2.5 Datasets
To explore our research questions, we focus on the retweet network (including
quoted retweets) for links to either claims or fact-checking articles. A retweet
provides information about the primary spreader (retweeted account) and sec-
ondary spreader (retweeting account). To be sure, Hoaxy does collect any kind
of tweet, as long as a URL, whose Web domain matches our list of sources, is
included in the tweet. To give an idea of the full scope of the Hoaxy dataset,
retweets and quoted retweets occur 66.9% of the times; approximately 1 in 10
retweets is a quoted retweet. Of the remaining types of tweets, replies (i.e.
tweets forming a conversation thread and including an @-mention of another
users) account for 2.1% of the total. The remaining tweets are neither retweets
10
Table 1. Summary of the data used in the network analysis. Ef is the set of edges labeled as
‘fact-check.’
Network Period |V | |E| |Ef |
1 Claims + fact-checks pre-electiona 346, 573 1, 091, 552 279, 283
2 Claims only pre-a + post-electionb 630, 368 2, 236, 041 0
3 Claims only pre-electiona 227, 363 816, 453 0
aMay 16, 2016 – Nov. 7, 2016
bNov. 8, 2016 (Election Day) – Oct. 9, 2017
nor replies; they are original tweets.
The network is a graph defined as follows: we include a node for each Twitter
user account in the database. Edges are directed (as explained earlier) and
weighted. The weight of an edge represents the number of retweets from one
account to another. That is, we increase by one the weight on a directed edge
from user a to user b every time we observe that b retweets a. Edges are labeled
by the type of content being retweeted. To do so, we split the total weight w(e)
of edge e in two separate counts, one that keeps track of retweets of claims (wc)
and one of fact-checks (wf ), respectively. That is, w(e) = wc(e) + wf (e) for all
e ∈ E. We observe wc(e) ·wf (e) > 0 in only a small minority of edges, meaning
that we can easily label each edge as a ‘claim’ or ‘fact-check’ edge with a simple
majority rule (ties are broken at random).
Because prior work shows that collective attention patterns change dramat-
ically in the wake of highly anticipated events, like elections [53], we split our
analysis in two periods, pre- and post-Election Day (Nov. 8, 2016). Table 1 pro-
vides a summary of the three networks analyzed in this paper. We explore the
overall spread of content on the full network spanning six months before Election
Day, including both claims and fact-checking. We decompose this network into
its k-core shells to uncover the functional roles of the most densely connected
sub-graph. Row 1 of Table 1 shows summary statistics for the network used at
this stage.
The second dataset is used to study the diffusion of the sole misinformation,
therefore we ignore all edges labeled as ‘fact-check.’ To characterize the long-
term evolution of the main core, we extend the period of observation to October
9, 2017. Recall that 50 additional sources of claims were added to Hoaxy in De-
cember 2016. To keep our analysis consistent across the pre- and post-Election
Day periods, we do not include data from these sites in the present work. The
network in row 2 of Table 1 is considered at this stage.
The third dataset (row 3 of Table 1) includes only claims but goes back to
the pre-Election-Day period to characterize the most central users in the core
and the robustness of the network.
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3 Results
Having described in the prior section how Hoaxy collects data, let us now ana-
lyze the misinformation diffusion networks. To the best of our knowledge, the
following is the first in-depth analysis of the diffusion network of online misin-
formation and fact-checking in the period of the 2016 US Presidential Election.
3.1 Claims vs. fact-checking
We performed k-core decomposition of the entire network (row 1 of Table 1).
Fig. 5 visualizes different k-cores for increasing values of k. The main core is ob-
tained at max{k} = 50. We can draw several insights from these visualizations.
First, the force-directed layout algorithm splits the network in two communities.
There is substantial content segregation across these two communities, which we
denote as the ‘fact-checkers’ and (misinformation) ‘spreaders,’ respectively. The
edges across the two groups appear to be mostly colored in orange, suggesting
some exposure of misinformation spreaders to fact-checks. The group of fact-
checkers disappears as k is gradually increased, moving toward the innermost,
densest portion of the network.
However, it is still possible to appreciate some retweeting of fact-checking
content involving spreaders even in the main core (Fig. 5(d)). To understand in
more quantitative terms the role of fact-checking in the spread of information
in the core, we characterize users according to two simple metrics. Recall that
in a weighted, undirected network the strength of a node is the sum of all the
weights of all its incident edges, s(v) =
∑
e∈v w(e). In a directed network one
can likewise define the in-strength sin and the out-strength sout, by taking the
sum only on the incoming and outgoing edges, respectively. We further consider
edge labels and distinguish between claim (sc) and fact-check (sf ) strength. For
each node v ∈ V let us define two ratios, the fact-checking ratio ρf and the
retweet ratio ρin:
ρf (v) =
sf (v)
sf (v) + sc(v)
=
sf (v)
s(v)
(1)
ρin(v) =
sin(v)
sin(v) + sout(v)
=
sin(v)
s(v)
. (2)
Intuitively, a user with a value of ρf close to unity is going to be a fact-checker
(as opposed to claim spreader), whereas an account with a value of ρin close to
unity is going to be a secondary spreader of information, i.e., to amplify messages
through retweets rather than post original messages. The right-hand side of
Fig. 5 shows the joint distributions of (ρf , ρin) for different values of k. We
observe that for small values of k, most users fall close to the four corners of the
space, meaning that they take on exactly one of the four possible combinations
of roles (‘primary claim spreader’, ‘secondary claim spreader’, etc.).
For larger values of k (Fig. 5(c,d)), we observe a shift away from secondary
spreaders of fact-checking. In other words, the fact-checking links in the net-
work core are retweeted by accounts who mainly spread misinformation. Fig. 6
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Fig 5. k-Core decomposition of the pre-Election retweet network collected by
Hoaxy. Panels (a)-(d) show four different cores for values of k = 5, 15, 25, 50
respectively. Networks are visualized using a force-directed layout. Edge colors
represent the type of content: orange for fact-checks and purple for claims
(colors online). The innermost sub-graph (d), where each node has degree
k ≥ 50, corresponds to the main core. The heat maps show, for each core, the
distribution of accounts in the space represented by two coordinates: the
retweet ratio ρin and the fact-checking ratio ρf (see text).
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Fig 6. Average fact-checking ratio as a function of the shell number k for
activities of both primary spreading (‘out’) and secondary spreading (‘in’).
Error bars represent standard error.
confirms that the drop in the spread of fact-checking is precipitous. For k > 20
there is only a small, stable residual activity.
The fact that fact-checking still spreads in the main core is a somewhat sur-
prising observation. Therefore we search for patterns that explain how claim
spreaders interact with fact-checking. Manual inspection of the data let us iden-
tify three key characteristics of these retweets of fact-checking content made by
spreaders in the main core: (1) they link to fact-checking articles with biased,
misleading wording; (2) they attack fact-checking sites; or (3) they use language
that is inconsistent with the stance of a fact-checking article, for example imply-
ing that a claim is true even though the linked fact-checking article states that
it is false. A sample of tweets with each of the aforementioned characteristics
is shown in Table 2. Similar patterns of citing mainstream media to challenge
them have been observed by Starbird [32].
3.2 Anatomy of the main core
3.2.1 Core dynamics
Although we observe that the main core is dominated by misinformation spread-
ers, it is unclear if this has always been the case. From this point and in the
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Table 2. Sample of tweets with fact-checking content published by accounts
in the main core of the misinformation network.
Biased repetition
BREAKING NEWS! RINO GOP #NeverTrump Leader PAID $294K RINO TRAITORS pre-
fer #Hillary; Marxist SCOTUS Click https://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/contrib.
php?cid=N00035544&cycle=2016&type=I
HRC PRAISED HER KKK FRIEND MENTOR, BYRD! HRC IS RACIST! Hillary Kissed
by Former Klan Member http://www.snopes.com/clinton-byrd-photo-klan/
Attacks on fact-checking
Newsflash: Snopes itself is a biased left-wing Clinton mouthpiece She
knew he fooled the polygraph, was guilty http://www.snopes.com/
hillary-clinton-freed-child-rapist-laughed-about-it/
Lying Politifact caught telling another objective lie. CNN Is Hitler. http:
//www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/aug/23/donald-trump/
donald-trump-fundraising-email-takes-cnn-anchors-c/
Inconsistency with fact-checking stance
13 Hours of HELL in Benghazi! No HELP was Sent?? Her E-Mails Show SHE KNEW
THE TRUTH! #LIAR http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2016/feb/09/
what-did-hillary-clinton-tell-families-people-who-/
Machado had sex on camera while filing a reality show. The media is lying about there being
no sex tape. http://www.snopes.com/alicia-machado-adult-star/
subsequent analysis we discard all edges labeled as ‘fact-check’ and focus only on
the spread of misinformation. We start by investigating the long-term growth
of the network. To do so we consider a network based on the Hoaxy dataset
that extends post-Election Day; see row 2 of Table 1.
In particular we consider all retweets in our dataset in chronological order.
At any given point in time, we consider a snapshot of the network formed by all
retweets up to that point. We perform k-core decomposition on this cumulative
network. We extract two pieces of information: the maximum value of k and
the size of the main core. The left panel of Fig. 7 shows how these two quantities
change over time. We observe that the core gets both larger and denser. To
characterize the extent to which the increasing density is just a byproduct of
considering snapshots of growing size, we also plot the k of the main core for a
shuffled version of each snapshot (i.e., the configuration model of each snapshot).
In rewiring edges, we preserve the degree sequence of the network. While both
the actual and the rewired network grow denser, the actual network does so at
a higher rate, and the difference is statistically significant.
The main core reaches an equilibrium size of approximately 800 accounts
around Election Day (see inset of left panel of Fig. 7). This observations prompts
the question of who are the users in the main core, and whether there is substan-
tial churn in this group over time. By considering the intersection between two
consecutive main cores in the sequence, we find a low churn rate after a peak in
August (right panel of Fig. 7), implying a stable set of users who consistently
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Fig 7. Left: Change of main core size and k with the evolution of the
network. A rolling window of one week is applied to filter fluctuations. The
shuffled version is obtained by sampling from the configuration model. This is
repeated many times to obtain the 95% confidence interval shown in orange.
The inset shows the size of the main core over time. Right: Churn rate
(relative monthly change) of accounts in the main core.
drive network activities. In fact, there are 321 users who remain in the main
core for the whole duration of the observation period. The retweet network of
a subset of them is shown in Fig. 8.
3.2.2 Core membership
We now return to the period before the election. For this analysis we consider
the pre-Election network, whose statistics are described in row 3 of Table 1. We
use this network to characterize several aspects of how misinformation spreads
before the election, starting with the presence of automated accounts. We do
expect to find evidence of automation, given recent findings that show that a
sizable fraction of the broader Twitter conversation about the elections was due
to bots [54]. An open question is whether bots were successful at spreading
misinformation, which would be reflected by their tendency to locate in the
core of the network, as opposed to the periphery.
To determine the likelihood that the observed patterns of activity in the
core of the network are the result of the deployment of social bots, we perform
bot detection on a sample of accounts. After k-core decomposition, for each
k-shell, we sample 2000 accounts at random. If the size of a shell is smaller, we
include the whole shell. To estimate the likelihood that each of these account
is automated we compute a bot score by querying Botometer, a state-of-the-art
bot detection tool (see Methods). Fig. 9 shows a sharp increase in bot score as
we move toward the core of the network, confirming our hypothesis.
For at least some of the most important individuals in the network core, it
would be useful to have a behavioral description at a more granular level than
just group averages. To this end, we need first to define a subset of important
accounts. The network science toolbox provides us with several methods to
identify salient nodes. We consider four centrality metrics: in-strength sin,
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out-strength sout, PageRank [55], and betweenness [56]. The first two are local
measures of primary (sout) and secondary (sin) spreading activity. Intuitively,
sout captures influence, as measured by the number of times that an account
is retweeted. On the other hand, sin captures prolific accounts that retweet
a lot. The distribution of sin and sout is shown in Fig. 10 (left panel). Both
distributions are broad, and the range of out-strength is broader than that
of in-strength, due to the simple fact that, in networks of this size, the rate
at which one can be retweeted is generally larger than that at which one can
retweet others. The third and fourth measures are instead global notions of
centrality, based on random walks and shortest paths, respectively. Given that
these metrics capture fundamentally different notions of centrality, we expect
them to produce different rankings of the nodes in the network. The right panel
of Fig. 10 shows strong variation in the average rank of users in the main core,
confirming this intuition. The metric that seems to best capture the main core
is the in-strength, indicating that a majority of core accounts are secondary
spreaders (prolific accounts).
For each measure, we rank the accounts in the main core and consider the
top ten users. This exercise yields four lists of accounts, whose screen names
are shown in Table 3. There is little or no overlap between these lists, and
their union yields 34 unique accounts. Having identified a subset of moderate
size that includes main core members of potential interest, we performed a
qualitative analysis of these accounts. Three human raters were asked to inspect
the Twitter profile of each user independently, and to provide answers to the
following questions:
1. Bot or Human?
2. Partisanship?
3. Personal or organizational account?
4. How often does it share claims?
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Table 3. The top ten central users, ranked in descending order of centrality,
in the claim network before the 2016 Election. Rankings are based on four
different centrality metrics.
Betweenness PageRank sin sout
PrisonPlanet ImmoralReport PATROIT73 RealAlexJones
AlternativViewz BillPeriman BadCompany709 PrisonPlanet
RealAlexJones alllibertynews LovToRideMyTrek infowars
libertytarian eavesdropann PhilDeCarolis redflagnews
eavesdropann Lagartija Nix Roostrwoodstock Miami4Trump
BillPeriman MMUSA PPN Skinner147 beforeitsnews
wvufanagent99 retireleo MrNoahItALL KitDaniels1776
Miami4Trump Nuevomedio RESPECTPUNK434 V of Europe
Juliet777777 ish10040 Rubenz1133 Makada
ish10040 EntheosShines Cecil3695Cecil Tanya USA
Table 4. Annotation of central users. For categorical questions (1–3), the top
most frequent label, and its frequency, are reported. The question about claim
sharing frequency (4) was on a 5-point Likert scale; we report the mean and
standard deviation of the answers.
Betweenness PageRank sin sout
Bot/Human
Top Bot Bot Bot Bot
Freq. 6 6 4 4
Partisanship
Top Partisan Partisan Partisan Partisan
Freq. 10 7 7 8
Personal/Organizational
Top Personal Personal Personal Personal
Freq. 9 5 8 6
How often does it share claims?
Mean 2.9± 0.8 2.4± 0.9 2.6± 0.7 3± 1
For questions 1–3, whose answer is a categorical variable, the raters could
also choose ‘neither’ or ‘not sure’. After the annotators coded each account, for
each question we applied a majority rule to identify the consensus label. The
few cases in which a consensus could not be reached were broken by a fourth
rater (one of the authors). The results are shown in Table 4. We report results
for 32 of the 34 original accounts, since two accounts had been suspended by
Twitter, and thus could not be annotated. Many of the central accounts appear
to be automated and display a high degree of partisanship, all in support of the
same candidate.
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Fig 11. Left: Fraction of the retweets remaining vs. number of spreaders
disconnected in the network. Right: Fraction of unique claim links remaining
vs. number of spreaders disconnected in the network. The priority of
disconnected users is determined by ranking on the basis of different centrality
metrics: sin, sout, betweenness (BT), and PageRank (PR).
3.3 Network robustness
Our last question is about the overall robustness of the network (row 3 of Ta-
ble 1). We ask: How much does the efficient spread of claims rely on the activity
of the most central nodes? To explore this question we apply node disconnec-
tion, a standard procedure for estimating robustness in network science [57].
The idea is to remove one node at a time, and analyze how two simple metrics
are curtailed as a result: total volume of claim retweets, and total number of
unique claim links. The more these quantities can be reduced by removing a
small number of nodes, the more the efficiency of the misinformation network
is disrupted. We measure the fraction of retweets remaining after simulating
the scenario in which a certain number of accounts are disconnected, by remov-
ing all edges to and from those accounts. We prioritize accounts to disconnect
based on the four centrality metrics discussed before (sin, sout, betweenness, and
PageRank). Fig. 11 shows the result of the simulation. The greedy strategy that
ranks users by decreasing out-strength achieves the best reduction of both met-
rics. The efficiency of the network is greatly impaired even after disconnecting
as few as 10 most influential accounts (i.e., with greatest sout). Surprisingly,
disconnecting nodes with the highest sin is not an efficient strategy for reducing
claims; the network is robust with respect to the removal of bots and other
prolific accounts in the core. Betweenness, in comparison, seems to give good
results on the total number of retweets (left panel of Fig. 11), but does not
produce better results than PageRank and in-strength when considering unique
links (right panel).
From a policy perspective, we are not proposing that a social media platform
should suspend accounts whose posts are highly retweeted. Of course, platforms
must take great care in minimizing the chances that a legitimate account is
suspended. However, platforms do use various signals to identify and penalize
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low-quality information [35, 39]. The present analysis suggests that the use of
sout in the claim spreading network might provide a useful signal to prioritize
further review, with the goal of mitigating the spread of misinformation. Such
an approach assumes the availability of a list of low-quality sources, which can
be readily compiled.
4 Discussion
The rise of digital misinformation is calling into question the integrity of our in-
formation ecosystem. Here we made two contributions to the ongoing debate on
how to best combat this threat. First, we presented Hoaxy, an open platform
that enables large-scale, systematic studies of how misinformation and fact-
checking spread and compete on Twitter. We described key issues in its design
and implementation. All Hoaxy data is available through an open API. Second,
using data from Hoaxy, we presented an in-depth analysis of the misinforma-
tion diffusion network in the run up to and wake of the 2016 US Presidential
Election. We found that the network is strongly segregated along the two types
of information circulating in it, and that a dense, stable core emerged after
the election. We characterized the main core in terms of multiple centrality
measures and proposed an efficient strategies to reduce the circulation of in-
formation by penalizing key nodes in this network. The networks used in the
present analysis are available on an institutional repository (see Methods).
Recall that Hoaxy collects 100% of the tweets carrying each piece of mis-
information in our collection, not a sample. As a result, our analysis provides
a complete picture of the anatomy of the misinformation network. Of course,
our methodology has some unavoidable limitations. First of all, Hoaxy only
tracks a fixed, limited set of sources, due to data volume restrictions in the
public Twitter API. Of these sources, it only tracks how their content spreads
on Twitter, ignoring other social media platforms. Facebook, by far the largest
social media platform, does not provide access to data on shares, ostensibly for
privacy reasons, even though a significant fraction of misinformation spreads via
its pages [30], which are understood to be public. Thus we acknowledge that
coverage of our corpus of misinformation is incomplete. Nonetheless, by focus-
ing on sources that have come to the attention of large media and fact-checking
organizations, and that have been flagged as the most popular purveyors of un-
verified claims, Hoaxy captures a broad snapshot of misinformation circulating
online.
Second, Hoaxy does not track the spread of unsubstantiated claims in the
professional mainstream press. News websites do report unverified claims, in
a manner and with a frequency dictated by their own editorial standards. For
example, hedging language is often used to express degrees of uncertainty [58].
While most claims reported in the mainstream media are eventually verified,
many remain unverified, and some even turn out to be false. Some instances
of misinformation may see their spread boosted as a result of additional expo-
sure on mainstream news outlets. Understanding the dynamics of the broader
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media and information ecosystem is therefore needed to fully comprehend the
phenomenon of digital misinformation, but it is outside the scope of the present
work.
Third, we consider only US-based sources publishing English content. This
is an unavoidable consequence of our reliance on lists produced by US-based
media organizations. Different sources will be of course active in different coun-
tries. Worrisome amounts of misinformation, for example, have been observed
in the run-up to the general elections in France [14]. To foster the study of
misinformation in non-US contexts, we have released the code of Hoaxy under
an open-source license, so that other groups can build upon our work [59,60].
Last but not least, it is important to reiterate that the claims collected by
Hoaxy are in general not verified. Inspection of our corpus confirms that not
all claims collected by Hoaxy are completely inaccurate. As far as the present
analysis is concerned, we provide an assessment of the rate of confirmed claims
in our dataset (see Methods). When used as a search engine for misinformation,
Hoaxy addresses this limitation by showing the most relevant fact-checking ar-
ticles matching the input query, thereby facilitating claim verification. We hope
that the data, software, and visualizations offered by the Hoaxy platform will be
useful to researchers, reporters, policymakers, and, last but not least, ordinary
Internet users as they learn to cope with online misinformation.
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